

REMARKS

Applicant has carefully reviewed the Application in light of the Office Action dated July 17, 2007. Claims 1-36 and 38-46 are pending. Applicant respectfully requests reconsideration of the application in accordance with the following remarks.

Section 103 Rejections

Claims 1-8, 10, 12-15, 18-28, and 32-35 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 7,136,849 to Patrick ("Patrick"), U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0189693 to Kenig ("Kenig"), and U.S. Patent No. 5,977,969 to DiAngelo ("DiAngelo"). Applicant respectfully disagrees that the claims are unpatentable over the cited references.

Claim 1 recites "identifying a portion of the URL that corresponds to a hostname component of the URL" and "visually distinguishing the hostname component of the URL from other components of the URL." As indicated in the Office Action, the Patrick and Kenig references fail to teach visually distinguishing an identified hostname component of the URL from other components of the URL (Office Action, page 3). In addition, the DiAngelo reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick and the Kenig references.

The DiAngelo reference teaches a dialog for entry of URLs that allows entry of blocks of text containing resource identifiers, domain identifiers, and filename extensions (DiAngelo, Abstract). The described block of text is visually distinguished from text entered by single characters from a physical or virtual keyboard (DiAngelo, Abstract). Thus, rather than teaching visually distinguishing an identified hostname component from other components of a URL, the DiAngelo reference teaches visually distinguishing text that is entered as blocks from text entered as single characters (DiAngelo, column 4, lines 25-30 and 47-50). The DiAngelo reference does not describe visually distinguishing a hostname component of a URL from other components of a URL. Accordingly, claim 1 and its corresponding claims are allowable over the cited art.

In addition, the teachings of the cited references are not properly combinable. The Patrick reference teaches a method of indicating that a link in a web document is to an external link by comparing the domain name of a current document to the link in question (Patrick, column 2, lines 9-11). The Kenig reference teaches an approach for visually depicting web server activity on a graphical user interface, in which when a user selects a GUI object having a specified IP address, a DNS lookup is performed to obtain the corresponding domain name which is displayed on the report (Kenig, paragraphs 0001 and 0045). The DiAngelo reference teaches visually distinguishing text that is entered as blocks of text from text entered as single characters (DiAngelo, column 4, lines 25-30 and 47-50). Thus, DiAngelo reference is not properly combinable with the Patrick reference since the Patrick reference compares preexisting links in a document. Text is not entered by blocks or by single characters, thus the visual distinguishing process taught by the DiAngelo reference would not produce any visually distinguished portions of the links described in the Patrick reference. In addition, the Office Action states that the motivation for visually distinguishing a hostname from other components in a URL is to enable the user to quickly and conveniently identify a hostname component among other URL components. However, Applicant submits that this is using hindsight to reconstruct the invention. The Office Action does not provide a citation to any reference asserted to teach such a motivation to combine the references. Accordingly, claim 1 and its corresponding claims are further allowable over the cited art.

Independent claims 25, and 35 recite limitations similar to claim 1. In particular, claim 25 recites “visually distinguishing the hostname component of the URL from other components of the URL” and claim 35 recites “means for visually distinguishing the hostname component of the URL from other components of the URL.” Accordingly, for at least the reasons mentioned in connection with claim 1, claims 25 and 35 and their corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 9, 11, and 31 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Kenig, DiAngelo, and U.S. Patent No. 5,961,591 to Jones et al. ("Jones"). Claims 9 and 11 are dependent on claim 1 and claim 31 is dependent on claim 25. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claims 1 and 25, the Patrick, the Kenig, and the DiAngelo references fail to teach visually distinguishing an hostname component from other components of a URL, as recited in claims 1 and 25. The Jones reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Kenig, and the DiAngelo references. Thus, claims 1 and 25 and their corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 16-17 and 29-30 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Kenig, DiAngelo, and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2004/0169685 to Kubala ("Kubala"). Claims 16-17 are dependent on claim 1 and claims 29-30 are dependent on claim 25. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claims 1 and 25, the Patrick, Kenig, and DiAngelo references fail to teach visually distinguishing an hostname component from other components of a URL, as recited in claims 1 and 25. The Kubala reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Kenig, and the DiAngelo references. Thus, claims 1 and 25 and their corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 36, 38, 40, and 43-46 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Jones, and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2003/0131060 to Hartselle ("Hartselle"). Applicant respectfully disagrees that the claims are unpatentable over the cited references.

Claim 36 recites "identifying at least one other portion of the URL that corresponds to other components of the URL" and "determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of the hostname component and the other components." As indicated in the Office Action, the Patrick reference and the Jones reference do not teach identifying at least one other

portion of a URL that corresponds to other components of a URL and determining whether a URL is suspicious based on an analysis of an hostname component and other components (Office Action, page 10). The Hartselle reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick and the Jones references.

The Hartselle reference teaches providing electronic mail messages that self-destruct after a specified time period has elapsed (Hartselle, paragraph 0001). Prior to sending the described self-destructing message, the e-mail client application may determine whether any of the intended recipients are located on a network physically or logically beyond the sender's home e-mail domain (Hartselle, paragraph 0045). The Hartselle reference states that if the user's home e-mail address is "user@bellsouth.com", the e-mail client application would determine whether any intended recipient's e-mail addresses are located at a domain other than "bellsouth.com". Thus, the Hartselle reference does not teach identifying at least one other portion of a URL that corresponds to other components of a URL and determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of an hostname component and other components. Instead, the Hartselle reference teaches determining if email addresses are associated with a domain other than a user's domain. As recited in claim 36, a determination of whether a URL is suspicious is made based on an analysis of a hostname component and other components of a URL. However, the Hartselle reference teaches a comparison of only domain names in two different email addresses and not an analysis of a hostname and other components of the same URL. Applicant submits that identifying whether one email address has a different domain than another email address is not the same as determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of a hostname component and other components of a URL. Accordingly, claim 36 and its dependent claims are allowable over the cited art.

Claims 39, 41, and 42 were rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Jones, Hartselle, and Kenig. Claims 39, 41, and 42 depend on claim 36. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claim 36, the Patrick, the Jones, and the

Hartselle references do not teach identifying at least one other portion of a URL that corresponds to other components of a URL and determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of an hostname component and other components. The Kenig reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Jones, and the Hartselle references. Accordingly, claim 36 and its corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited references.

Claim 42 was rejected under U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Patrick, Jones, Hartselle, Kenig, and DiAngelo. Claim 42 depends on claim 36. For at least the reasons previously mentioned in connection with claims 36, 39, 41, and 42, the Patrick, the Jones, the Hartselle, and the Kenig references do not teach identifying at least one other portion of a URL that corresponds to other components of a URL and determining whether the URL is suspicious based on an analysis of an hostname component and other components. The DiAngelo reference fails to rectify the deficiencies of the Patrick, the Jones, the Hartselle, and the Kenig references. Accordingly, claim 36 and its corresponding dependent claims are allowable over the cited references.

CONCLUSION

It is believed that all of the pending claims have been addressed. However, the absence of a reply to a specific rejection, issue or comment does not signify agreement with or concession of that rejection, issue, or comment. In addition, because the arguments made above may not be exhaustive, there may be reasons for patentability of any or all pending claims (or other claims) that have not been expressed. Finally, nothing in this paper should be construed as an intent to concede any issue with regard to any claim, except as specifically stated in this paper, and the amendment of any claim does not necessarily signify concession of unpatentability of the claim prior to its amendment.

In view of the above, and for other reasons clearly apparent, Applicant respectfully submits that the Application is in condition for allowance, and request such a Notice. If the present Application is not allowed and/or if one or more of the rejections is maintained or made final, Applicant hereby requests a telephone conference with the Examiner and further requests that the Examiner contact the undersigned attorney to schedule a telephone conference.

If any extension of time is required, Applicant hereby requests the appropriate extension of time. Please apply any charges or credits to Deposit Account No. 06-1050.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: October 17, 2007

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